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Abstract
We provide a new, much simplified and straightforward proof to a result of Pavlov [7]
regarding the revenue maximizing mechanism for selling two goods with uniformly i.i.d. val-
uations over intervals [c, c + 1], to an additive buyer. This is done by explicitly defining
optimal dual solutions to a relaxed version of the problem, where the convexity requirement
for the bidder’s utility has been dropped. Their optimality comes directly from their struc-
ture, through the use of exact complementarity. For c = 0 and c ≥ 0.092 it turns out that
the corresponding optimal primal solution is a feasible selling mechanism, thus the initial
relaxation comes without a loss, and revenue maximality follows. However, for 0 < c < 0.092
that’s not the case, providing the first clear example where relaxing convexity provably does
not come for free, even in a two-item regularly i.i.d. setting.
1 Introduction
In this short note we deal with the problem of maximizing the expected revenue of a two-good
monopolist when facing an additive buyer whose values for the goods come uniformly i.i.d. over
intervals [c, c + 1], c > 0. Notice that the optimization here is not only over deterministic
mechanisms (i.e. price schedules), but all possible lotteries as well. The general model of such
additive bayesian auctions has been extensively studied in the last years and the particular
problem was solved by Pavlov [7]. In the case of c = 0, the optimal selling mechanism is
deterministic with prices 2/3 for each of the items and (4−√2)/3 for their bundle. This result
was already known by the work of Manelli and Vincent [5], and an alternative proof based on
duality and complementarity can be found also in [2]. For c ≥ 0.077, the optimal mechanism
is again deterministic and it only offers the full bundle for a price of (4c +
√
4c2 + 6)/3. For
the range in between, that is for c ∈ (0, 0.077), Pavlov numerically computes that the optimal
mechanism is a randomized one, with a menu-complexity [4] of 4.
Here, we present a very simple alternative proof for the cases of c = 0 and c ≥ 0.092. For the
remaining case, although we give the optimal solution to the primal-dual framework upon which
our proof technique is based, it turns out that it is not convex and that its objective value is
strictly greater than the optimal revenue that can be achieved by any feasible selling mechanism.
This is because our primal program is a relaxed version of the original revenue-maximization
one, dropping the convexity constraint for the bidder’s utility function. This relaxation is the
standard approach so far in duality theory frameworks for such problems (see [1, 2]). So, this
is a demonstration of the necessity, in general, of the convexity requirement for exact optimal
mechanism design, even in the case of two regularly i.i.d. items1. Nevertheless, on the positive
side, we are able to demonstrate that the two solutions are practically very close to each-other
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Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) grant 284731 (UaESMC).
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1An example of the necessity of convexity is also given in [2, Appendix C], even for one item, but the
distribution used there is not regular.
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(within a factor of 7.5%): in Fig. 4 we provide upper bounds on approximation ratios for that
optimal relaxed primal value with respect to the revenue achieved by the best randomized, the
best deterministic and the best full-bundling mechanisms.
A characteristic of our method that differentiates it from previous revenue maximization
results that use duality frameworks is that it is completely constructive: we give explicit, simple
closed-form definitions of the dual functions, rather than just proving their existence. This
immediately allows for a trivial check of optimality: just compute their (dual objective) value and
see if this coincides with the revenue induced by the (primal) utility function. However, we follow
an even simpler way: we deploy (tight) complementarity from the framework of Giannakopoulos
and Koutsoupias [2] and so we can verify their optimality just by looking at some simple features
of their structure.
2 Primal-Dual Formulation
The problem of maximizing revenue in our setting boils down to maximizing∫ c+1
c
∫ c+1
c
∂u(x)
∂x1
x1 +
∂u(x)
∂x2
x2 − u(x) dx (1)
over the space of all convex2 functions u : [c, c + 1]2 −→ R≥0 with partial derivatives in [0, 1].
Then, the optimal mechanism can be recovered completely by the bidder’s utility function u (see
e.g. [8, 3]): the probability of allocating item j to the bidder when she declares bids x = (x1, x2)
is ∂u(x)/∂xj and the payment she has to submit equals ∇u(x) · x − u(x). For example, that
means that any deterministic mechanism for our setting is induced by a utility of the form u(x) =
max {0, x1 − p1, x2 − p2, x1 + x2 − p}, where p1 = p2 3 is the price the seller sets for each one of
the items and p the price for their combined bundle. In particular, the work of Pavlov [7] tells
us that for c = 0 revenue (1) is maximized by u(x) = max
{
0, x1 − 23 , x2 − 23 , x1 + x2 − 4−
√
2
3
}
and for c ≥ 0.077 by u(x) = max
{
0, x1 + x2 − (4c+
√
4c2 + 6)/3
}
.
For ease of reference, we briefly mention below the tools we’ll need from the duality framework
of [2]. We relax the above initial problem of revenue maximization by dropping the convexity
constraint on u, as well as the lower bound on the derivatives ∇u ≥ 0. This results in the
following optimization problem which we’ll refer to as primal : supu˜
∫
[c,c+1]2 ∇u(x) · x − u(x)
where u˜ : [c, c+ 1]2 −→ R≥0 is absolutely continuous with
∂u(x)
∂x1
,
∂u(x)
∂x2
≤ 1 (2)
for almost every (a.e.) x ∈ [c, c+ 1]2. Its dual is: infz1,z2
∫
[c,c+1]2 z1 + z2 where zj : [c, c+ 1]
2 −→
R≥0 is absolutely continuous with respect to its j-th coordinate and
∂z1(x)
∂x2
+
∂z2(x)
∂x2
≤ 3 (3)
z1(c, x2), z2(x1, c) ≤ c, (4)
z1(c+ 1, x2), z1(x1, c+ 1) ≥ c+ 1, (5)
a.e. in [c, c+1]2. Then, the following tool which strongly resembles traditional LP complementary
slackness can be used to demonstrate tight solutions:
2Convexity comes from the requirement that the selling mechanisms need to be truthful, that is, the buyer
has no incentive to misreport her true valuation profile x (see e.g. [3]). Notice that this restriction is without loss
with respect to the revenue maximization objective, due to the Revelation Principle[6].
3Symmetry here comes without a loss, see e.g. [3, Appendix 1].
2
Lemma 1 (Exact Complementarity). If for almost every x ∈ [c, c+ 1] the following conditions
hold for a pair of primal and dual solutions u˜ and z1, z2 then they are both optimal:
• Either u˜(x) is zero or the dual constraints (3)–(5) hold with strict equality
• For any j = 1, 2, either zj(x) is zero or the corresponding primal constraint in (2) holds
with strict equality.
3 The case of 0 ≤ c ≤ 0.092
Consider the pair of primal-dual variables u˜, (z1, z2) whose derivatives are given in Fig. 1. The
duals z1, z2 are symmetric, in the sense that z1(x1, x2) = z2(x2, x1) for all x. Notice that this is
enough to completely define them, by the initial conditions u˜(x) = 0 and z1(x) = 0, z1(x) = c
given in the white and red areas. We will argue that they are optimal. By looking at their
structure in Fig. 1, it is easy to see that the applicability of the (exact) complementarity Lemma 1
is just a matter of simple calculations, essentially to check constraints (3)–(5). Optimality would
be immediate.
To do that, first of all we need to check that the specific parameters give rise to a consistent
partitioning of the allocation space, and in particular that c ≤ d ≤ b ≤ q ≤ r ≤ c + 1,
r − q = d − c and p = q + b. Given the choice of the parameters, it is trivial to check that
the two last equalities are satisfied. The first chain of inequalities is satisfied for all 0 ≤ c ≤ c¯
where c¯ =
√
15− 8√2 − 2√2 + 1 ≈ 0.0915. At this value c = c¯ we get the limiting situation
when d = b and p = r, and u˜ is a feasible utility function of the mechanism that offer only the
full-bundle for a price of p. On the other hand, notice that for c = 0 we get q = r and d = c,
and the pair of primal-duals naturally reduces to the well-know optimal selling mechanism for
two uniform items on [0, 1] with prices q = 23 and p =
4−√2
3 for the one- and two-item bundles
respectively.
We now just have to show that z1 is feasible. In particular, it is again easy to calculate
that z1(c+ 1, x2) = c+ 1, given the values of the parameters, the definition of φ and the initial
condition z1(a, x2) = c for x2 > r and z1(c, x2) = 0 otherwise. The only thing remaining
to check is that z1 never falls below zero. This can be done by easily verifying that indeed
c+
∫ d
c 3− φ(t) dt = 0, so z1 is nonnegative at the upper critical stripe. Everywhere else, all its
derivatives are nonnegative, so it cannot decrease further.
3.1 The Necessity of Convexity
The optimality of the solutions in Fig. 1 is not able to directly also give us an optimal selling
mechanism, because the primal solution u˜ constructed there is not convex. In fact, one can show
that no mechanism can achieve the primal optimal objective of u˜, which equals
2
27
[(√
2− 4
)
c3 + 3
(√
c(3c+ 2) +
√
2 + 1
)
c2 +
(
2
√
c(3c+ 2) + 3
√
2 + 12
)
c+
√
2 + 6
]
≡ Opt(c)
This proves that dropping the convexity constraint (in the initial formulation of our primal
program) is not without loss, even in the simplest of settings: one bidder, two i.i.d. uniform
items over [c, c + 1] with 0 ≤ c ≤ c¯. However, it turns out that this optimal objective is still
not far away from the optimal mechanism’s revenue, in fact it is extremely close even to that
of the best deterministic or just the best full-bundle mechanism. Specifically in Fig. 4 one can
see that the best randomized mechanism is within a factor of 7.5%, and the best deterministic
and full-bundle within factors of 2% and 9%, respectively, with respect to Opt(c).
Let’s make this discussion more rigorous. As we’ve mentioned before, our primal-dual for-
mulation relaxes the original optimal revenue problem in two ways: first drop the convexity
constraint, that corresponds to the truthfulness requirement; then we drop the dual variables
3
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(a) The values of ∇u˜(x) of an optimal primal solution u˜.
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(b) The values of ∂z1(x)/∂x1. The duals are symmetric and
so ∂z2(x)/∂x2 can be recovered by the relation ∂z2/∂x2 =
3 − ∂z1/∂x1 in the gray area (and z2 = 0 in the white). Here
φ(x) = c+1−3(x−c)c+1−r .
Figure 1: A pair of optimal primal-dual solutions for 0 ≤ c ≤ 0.092. Notice how the primal
solution u˜ in Fig. 1a is not convex, so it does not correspond to a valid utility function of a truthful
selling mechanism. The values of the various parameters are: q = 2(c+1)3 , p =
4−√2
3 (c+1), h =
p
2 ,
b = p− q, r = 13
(
2 + c+
√
c(2 + 3c)
)
, d = 13
(
2c+
√
c(2 + 3c)
)
.
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sj that correspond to the primal constraints ∇u(x) ≥ 0. The latter relaxation has no actual
effect to the optimal solution of the primal-dual programs, at least for the particular case we
study here of i.i.d. uniform valuations over intervals of the form [c, c + 1]. The reason for that
is simple: the optimal solution u˜ that we get after all relaxations satisfies ∇u˜(x) ≥ 0 anyways.
So now let’s focus on the necessity of the crucial remaining condition, that of convexity. By
Pavlov’s results we know that for c > 0.077 full bundling is an optimal selling mechanism. Such a
mechanism in our setting sets a take-it-or-leave-it price s for both items together, thus having an
expected revenue of
[1− (s−2c)2/2]s (a simple probabilistic argument, taking into consideration the area of the gray
region in that case). This is maximized for s being the root of 27s3 − 108s2c+ s (108c2 − 54)−
16c3 + 4
√
2
√
(2c2 + 3)3 + 72c = 0 giving a revenue of
BRev(c) =
2
27
(
−4c3 +
√
2
√
(2c2 + 3)3 + 18c
)
,
which, as we said, is also the optimal revenue for c > 0.077. However, it is easy to check that
for all 0.077 < c < c¯ it strictly holds BRev(c) < Opt(c), demonstrating the gap caused by
dropping convexity.
4 The case of c ≥ 0.092
For c ≥ c¯ it turns out that convexity is indeed not needed and the optimal solution of the
primal-dual programs give also the optimal selling mechanism, which is a full-bundling one, as
can be seen by the complementarity of the pair of primal-dual solutions we propose in Fig. 2.
It is again a matter of trivial calculations to check that indeed z1(c + 1, x2) = c + 1 for
all x2 ∈ [c, c + 1]. The point that needs more attention is making sure that z1 does not get
negative. There is a risk of getting below 0 at the top stripe q ≤ x2 ≤ c + 1, and in particular
in the box where a ≤ x1 ≤ h. A simple derivative argument shows us that z1 achieves a
minimum there at x1 = x∗1 ≡ 13
(
2c− 2√4c2 + 6
)
and solving z1(x∗1, x2) ≥ 0 we get that
c ≥
√
15− 8√2 − 2√2 + 1 = c¯, which is exactly the the case we are in, complementary to the
previous Sect. 3.
We must mention here that there is also a more unified dual solution scheme that can cover
both cases of Sect. 3 and Sect. 4 at the same time: simply replace the dual solution in Fig. 1b
for c ≤ c¯ by the slightly more involved in Fig. 3 which however now fits smoothly with the one
in Fig. 2b for the other case of c ≥ c¯.
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(a) Best randomized selling mechanism, 1.00075-approximate.
To plot this one can use the form of the optimal auction given
in [7].
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(b) Best deterministic selling mechanism, 1.002-approximate.
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(c) Best full-bundle mechanism, 1.009-approximate.
Figure 4: Approximation ratios of the best randomized (Fig. 4a), deterministic (Fig. 4b) and
full-bundle (Fig. 4c) selling mechanisms with respect to the optimal objective of the primal-dual
approach with relaxed convexity, for 0 ≤ c ≤ c¯ = 0.092
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